Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
Volume 9

Issue 1

2020

Property, Unbundled Water Entitlements, and Anticommons
Tragedies: A Cautionary Tale From Australia
Paul Babie
Adelaide Law School

Paul Leadbeter
Adelaide Law School

Kyriaco Nikias
Adelaide Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, Property Law and
Real Estate Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul Babie, Paul Leadbeter & Kyriaco Nikias, Property, Unbundled Water Entitlements, and Anticommons
Tragedies: A Cautionary Tale From Australia, 9 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 107 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol9/iss1/4

10.36640/mjeal.9.1.property
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative
Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/25/2020 4:03 PM

PROPERTY, UNBUNDLED WATER
ENTITLEMENTS, AND
ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDIES:
A CAUTIONARY TALE FROM AUSTRALIA
Paul Babie, * Paul Leadbeter, † and Kyriaco Nikias+
ABSTRACT
As water becomes an increasingly scarce resource, a lack of clarity in relation to its
use can produce both conflict among and inefficient use by users. In order to encourage
markets in water and to ensure the viability and functionality of those markets,
governments in many jurisdictions have moved away from commons property as a means
of water allocation, and towards systems of private property in water. In doing so, one
policy and legal option is “unbundling”, which seeks carefully to define both the entitlement
to water and its separation into constituent parts. Advocates claim that unbundling makes
water rights easier to value, monitor, and trade. But is unbundling the most efficient
means of allocating water use rights? Or might such fragmentation produce what has come
to be called an “anticommons tragedy”? To answer these questions, this article contains
four parts. The Introduction provides the legal background to the modern means of
allocating the use of water amongst competing, or rivalrous, users. Part I considers the
theoretical nature of property, and the way in which such theory might be extended to
water allocation through unbundling. Part II presents unbundling as it has been
implemented in the Australian state of South Australia. This allows us to assess the extent
to which the stated policy rationale for unbundling—certainty and transferability of
entitlements—has been achieved and the extent to which this is a desirable outcome. Our
analysis can be applied to any jurisdiction, most notably the arid and semi-arid
southwestern United States, considering unbundling as a legal and policy option for the
allocation of water use. The Conclusion reflects upon the potential for unbundling water
entitlements in arid or semi-arid environments. The South Australian experience reveals
a reluctance to embrace unbundling, both on the part of the state in terms of implementing,
and on the part of market actors holding existing proprietary interests in water. This
reluctance ought to be viewed by other jurisdictions as a warning about the effectiveness
and efficiency of unbundling. We show that unbundling efforts may not only fail to
provide efficiency gains, but also, and much more worryingly, may in fact drive
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anticommons tragedies that entirely inhibit any beneficial use. We propose that our
anecdotal and theoretical analysis of South Australia requires empirical research both in
Australia and in other jurisdictions climatologically, hydrologically, and in underlying
legal framework, similar to Australia. Such empirical research will test our conclusions in
relation to South Australia, both in respect to the operation of the water market and as to
the behavior of market actors.
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INTRODUCTION:
WATER LAW IN ARID AND SEMI-ARID ENVIRONMENTS
The allocation of proprietary interests in scarce, fugacious natural resources
bedevils most of the legal systems the world has known. In relation to petroleum
resources, for instance, John Bishop Ballem, the leading Canadian authority on the
subject, tells us that
[t]he petroleum and natural gas lease is a curious document. It has to be.
Any legal instrument that purports to define property rights over minerals inconsiderate enough to move from one place to another, and under1
ground at that, cannot be expected to follow the conventional form.
Water behaves in a very similar way to petroleum resources, both on and below the
2
surface of land. As such, it exhibits the same difficulties of characterizing and defining proprietary interests. Kevin Gray writes “in English law water is incapable

1.
John Bishop Ballem, The Perilous Life of an Oil and Gas Lease, 44 CAN. BAR REV. 523, 523
(1966); see also JOHN BISHOP BALLEM, THE OIL AND GAS LEASE IN CANADA 3 (4th ed. 2008).
2.

See KEVIN GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 25 (2nd ed. 1993).
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of being owned.” 3 For that reason, “[a]lthough . . . [it] can contemplate with equanimity the conveyance of an estate in thin air, it has substantially more difficulty in
4
relation to a conveyance of water.” Joshua Getzler expands:
Flowing water cannot be possessed in a tangible fashion like land, only
quasi-possessed or appropriated by user. The common-law theory of title
based on a hierarchy of seisin or possession required some apparent user—a matter of evidence—in order to establish an actionable right. The
requirement of established use to ground seisin was emphasized by the
rise to dominance of the trespass on the case form of action, which characteristically focused on indirect or non-invasive damage. Hence water
rights defended by action on the case came to appear as possessory interests based upon current usage, rather than titles or claims to a resource
regardless of levels of use; and the legal system found it particularly difficult to evolve doctrines describing and balancing such use-claims. Added
to this is the issue of balancing the interests of multiple yet rivalrous users: ‘Problems concerned with the sharing of water supplies and joint utilization of river systems are inherently unsuited to adjudicative solution,
involving as they do a complex interplay of diverse interests’ concluded
Lon Fuller in a sociological analysis of western American water law.5
The problem is complicated by the obvious relationship between land and the water that runs through, under, or over it. Thus, Megarry and Wade, in the leading
text on English real property law, say this:
A landowner [at common law] has no property in water which either percolates through his land or flows through it in a defined channel. In the
case of percolating water, at common law the landowner could draw any
or all of it off without regard to the claims of neighbouring owners . . . .
In the case of water flowing through a defined channel, even at common
law the riparian owner (the owner of the land through which the water
6
flows) could not always take all the water . . . .

3.
Id. (citing Alfred F. Beckett Ltd. v Lyons (1967) Ch 449, 481G–482A (U.K.); Attorney-General
ex rel Yorkshire Derwent Trust Ltd. v Brotherton (1992) 1 AC (HL) 425, 441A (Eng.); WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 14 (1753)).
4.

GRAY, supra note 2, at 24-25.

5.
JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 2 (2004) (citing L.
L. Fuller, Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STANFORD L. REV. 1021, 1042 (1965)). See generally id. at 2, n.2; A.
S. WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOURSES (4th ed. 1979).
6.
SIR ROBERT MEGARRY & H. W. R. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 65 (5th ed.
1984) (internal citations omitted).
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Thus, the English law historically came to the conclusion that “[i]nland water
(whether a river or lake) is considered to be merely ‘a species of land’, in that law7
yers regard such areas of water as simply areas of ‘land covered with water.’”
The experience of other jurisdictions reveals a similar development of water
law so as to suit unique social and economic circumstances and physical condi8
tions. In those parts of the world which received the common law, water law began with the English position and was adapted over time to local needs. Scott S.
Slater, writes:
As our living and working environments are subject to continuous alteration by the forces of nature and humanity, there are corresponding impacts on where we find water and how we use it. Thus, it is often stated
that a good water resource allocation law must be flexible and susceptible
to effective conflict resolution in an evolutionary world or face being discarded as outdated. Just as frequently, it is stated that the basis of any effective water resource allocation system is the need for certainty. Simply,
if there are no assurances that the rules which determine ownership, allocation, and regulation of property today will also govern conduct tomorrow, a socially unacceptable waste of economic resources will result. No
certainty, no investment. No investment, no economic growth and stability. This leaves us with an interesting paradox: A good law that seeks to
allocate a scarce resource must provide for change and must at the same
time provide certainty.9
Property, both as a concept and as a legal vehicle used for the allocation of the
use of scarce resources, seeks to achieve Slater’s twin objectives—certainty and
adaptability—for a system of water law. As such, it underpins every method yet
10
devised by any legal system for allocating the water resource. Property can ensure
security of the entitlement to water, however that is defined, and good use of that
resource, whatever that might mean. It can also adapt that allocation to changing
11
circumstances, be they social, economic, political, or environmental.

7.

GRAY, supra note 2, at 25 (citing B LACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 18).

8.

See generally DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN
WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 2 (1986); WATER & POWER: A CALIFORNIA HEIST (Jigsaw
Productions/National Geographic Documentary Films Jan. 23, 2017).
9.
See 1 SCOTT S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY § 1.02 (2017) (internal
citations omitted).
10.
See id. For the proprietary nature of Australian entitlements see ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v
Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 158 (Austl.); Michael Mckenzie, Water Rights in NSW: Properly Property?, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 443, 443-44 (2009). See generally D. E. Fisher, Water Law, The High
Court and Techniques of Judicial Reasoning, 27 ENV’T AND PLANNING L. J. 85 (2010).
11.
See Dolores Rey et al., Role of Economic Instruments in Water Allocation Reform: Lessons from
Europe, INT’L J. OF WATER RES. DEV. 224, 224-25 (2018).
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Over time, then, different legal systems developed different approaches to allocating water. Every system took as its starting point the definition of a proprie12
tary interest in the resource. The first effort at defining a proprietary water right
came from English common law judges, drawing upon the Roman law legacy of
13
rights in water. In countries tracing their modern origins to the age of English
colonization, such as the United States and Australia, the common law struggled to
deal with the way in which property might be held in water. The struggle focused
primarily on the tension between whether a land-holder whose land abutted running water (the “riparian holder”) would have a right paramount to any other right,
14
including prior use, and giving paramountcy to a prior user. Many nations ultimately settled on the system known as riparian rights, which, as we have noted,
treated water flowing over land as if it were simply land. A riparian rights system
provides two important rights in respect of such landholding: flow and abstraction.
Megarry and Wade provide succinct summaries of the riparian rights of flow and
abstraction; the former this way:
[The riparian titleholder] is entitled to the flow of water through the land
unaltered in volume or quality, subject to ordinary and reasonable use by
the upper riparian owners, though he has no right to object to the level of
the water being lowered unless this causes damage or a nuisance. He is
15
bound by corresponding obligations to the lower riparian owners.
And the riparian right of abstraction as
[t]he ordinary and reasonable use which at common law a riparian owner
was entitled to make of the water flowing through his land was—
(i) the right to take and use all water necessary for ordinary purposes
connected with his riparian tenement (such as for watering his cattle
or for domestic purposes, or, possibly, in some manufacturing districts, for manufacturing purposes), even though this completely exhausted the stream; and
(ii) the right to use the water for extraordinary purposes connected with
his riparian tenement, provided the use was reasonable and the water
was restored substantially undiminished in volume and unaltered in
12.
See ALASTAIR R. LUCAS, SECURITY OF TITLE IN CANADIAN WATER RIGHTS 7 (1990);
David R. Percy, Responding to Water Scarcity in Western Canada, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2091, 2094 (2005)
[hereinafter Percy, Water Scarcity]; DAVID R. PERCY, THE FRAMEWORK OF WATER RIGHTS
LEGISLATION IN CANADA 12-13 (1988) [hereinafter P ERCY, WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION].
13.
See GETZLER, supra note 5, at 9. See also Joshua Getzler, Roman Ideas of Landownership, in
LAND LAW: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 81, 86-87 (Susan Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998); Joshua
Getzler, Theories of Property and Economic Development, 26 J. INTERDISCIP. HIST. 639, 651-52 (1996).
14.
See Percy, Water Scarcity, supra note 12, at 2095; PERCY, WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION,
supra note 12, at 5-9.
15.

MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 6, at 66 (internal citations omitted).
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character. Such purposes included irrigation and (in all districts)
manufacturing purposes, such as for cooling apparatus. The amount
by which the flow might be diminished was a question of degree in
16
each case.
The riparian owner of only one bank of a non-tidal watercourse enjoyed ripar17
ian rights up to the middle of the stream. If the waters were tidal, the Crown or
State was entitled to the foreshore (the land between the ordinary high and low
water marks), negating any natural riparian rights (although even in the case of tid18
al waters it was possible for riparian rights to exist). Whatever rights to water
that did exist depended, then, upon the holding of riparian land (that covered by
19
water). This tied whatever rights the common law recognized in water, which was
something less than a proprietary interest, to the estate or interest (ownership) in
the riparian land.
Riparian rights worked well in water rich England, achieving for the most part
20
Slater’s twin objectives of certainty and adaptability. However, the riparian rights
system proved unadaptable to some of those places into which the common law
flowed through the British acquisition of sovereignty. This was especially so in arid
and semi-arid regions, such as the southwestern United States and most of Austral21
ia. The climatic, hydrological, and environmental similarities between the two
regions mean that they are relevant comparators for the assessment of water entitlement reforms, from both a policy and a legal perspective.
California, for instance, has a “‘Mediterranean’ climate characterized by warm,
dry summers and mild winters.” Most precipitation falls in the winter as rain and
22
snow, and about 60% of it evaporates or is transpired by trees and vegetation. Of
that left, roughly seventy-five million acre-feet per average year flows into waterways and groundwater aquifers and ultimately becomes available to use in homes,
23
as irrigation for farmland, by industry, and in the environment. This is achieved
through a major system of water transfer—a massive system of dams, reservoirs,

16.

Id.

17.
See id. at 67 (internal citations omitted) (riparian rights accrue by virtue of holding riparian
land—they are not created by grant or conveyance).
18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.

LUCAS, supra note 12, at 5-8.

21.
Id. at 11-14; Sandford D. Clark & Ian A. Renard, The Riparian Doctrine and Australian Legislation, 7 MELB. U. L. REV. 475, 477-79 (1970).
22.
California Water 101, WATER EDUC. FOUND., https://www.watereducation.org/photogallery/california-water-101 (last visited May 30, 2019). See also CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES.,
CALIFORNIA CLIMATE SCIENCE AND DATA FOR WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 2-3 (2015),
https://water.ca.gov/LegacyFiles/climatechange/docs/CA_Climate_Science_and_Data_Final_Release_
June_2015.pdf.
23.

Id.
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aqueducts and canals—from northern California, which has 75% of California’s
available water, to the south, where 80% of the urban and agricultural water de24
mand occurs. California’s economy of $2.7 billion USD annually sits behind only
25
the United States itself, China, Japan and Germany, and it “depends [entirely] on
26
the development and management of water.”
Similarly, the Australian state of South Australia’s climate has traditionally
27
been described as Mediterranean, with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers.
This description, however, is really only appropriate to the southern settled areas,
those lying below the 34° latitude mark, and even then, generally only in the areas
28
closest to the Southern Ocean and the two gulfs of St. Vincent and Spencer. This
southern area is itself subject to seasonal fluctuations in both temperature and rainfall, owing to the weather influences of the dry, desert-like continental interior to
29
the north and the Southern Ocean to the south.
South Australia relies upon one river, the Murray, for 48.7% of its water sup30
ply. Like California, the region depends upon large reservoirs within the major
31
Metropolitan area of Adelaide, which contribute 44% of the water supply. Adelaide’s reservoirs are largely fed by run-off from the higher rainfall catchment of
the Mount Lofty Ranges and top-up water pumped from the River Murray in drier
32
years. Groundwater contributes 5.4% of the state’s water supply, largely in the
33
rural regions, with 1.9% of supply coming from desalinated seawater.
In recent years, South Australia has experienced “unprecedented[ly] dry
34
weather patterns,” likely a result of climate change. Long periods of low rainfall
have reduced flows into storages, rivers, watercourses and groundwater. “Flows in35
to the River Murray have been at their lowest since records began, 118 years ago.”
Within the state there has been a long history of over-allocation and over-use of
36
water from various sources. The decline in both the quantity and quality of water

24.

Id.

25.
California’s Economy Passes UK’s to Become World’s Fifth Biggest, THE GUARDIAN (May 4,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/04/california-economy-uk-fifth-largest.
26.

California Water 101, supra note 22.

27.

TREVOR GRIFFIN & MURRAY MCCASKILL, ATLAS OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA 50 (1986).

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.
Water Sources, SOUTH AUSTL. WATER CORP., https://www.sawater.com.au/communityand-environment/our-water-and-sewerage-systems/water-sources (last visited May 30, 2019).
31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.
Id. See Groundwater Use, AUSTL. GOVT. GEOSCIENCE AUSTL., http://www.ga.gov.au/
scientific-topics/water/groundwater/basics/groundwater-use (last visited June 22, 2019).
34.
GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., OFFICE FOR WATER SECURITY, WATER FOR GOOD: A PLAN TO
ENSURE OUR WATER FUTURE TO 2050 at 15 (2010).
35.

Id.

36.

Id.
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sourced from the River Murray has further complicated the water situation for
37
South Australia. In both California and South Australia, the ongoing effects of
38
climate change will only exacerbate the already limited supply of surface water.
Given the paucity of surface flowing water in both the southwestern United
States and in Australia, strict adherence to riparian rights would have resulted in
39
much land going entirely without water. For that reason, systems of allocation
which allowed water to be used on land otherwise entirely unconnected to any
40
flowing water—non-riparian land—emerged from economic and social exigencies.
Despite the development of new allocation systems, disputes in both the United States and in Australia remain frequent, ranging from the nature and content of
water entitlements to federalism disputes between the national and state governments. In the United States, a recently resolved conflict over control of water resources concerned the 1986 U.S.-California agreement over the Central Valley
41
Project and State Water Projects. In Australia, the administration of the MurrayDarling Basin pursuant to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement (the Australian
equivalent of the 1986 U.S.-California agreement) continues to be a point of tension between the Commonwealth (federal) government and the south-eastern
42
states (South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland).

37.

Id.

38.
See CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 22, at 1; GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., OFFICE
FOR WATER SECURITY, supra note 34.
39.

See LUCAS, supra note 12, at 1-15.

40.

Id.

41.
See, e.g., Sacramento Bee Editorial Bd., California Water Wars Would Get Crazy Complicated if
Trump Administration Dives In, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 31, 2018) https://www.sacbee.com/
opinion/editorials/article217621920.html. See also Agreement Between the United States of America and
the Department of Water Resources of the State of California for Coordinated Operation of the Central
Valley Project and the State Water Project, U.S.-CA, Nov. 24, 1986, No. 7-07-20-W0551,
https://water.ca.gov/-/media/DWR-Website/Web-Pages/Programs/State-WaterProject/Files/Coordinated-Agreement-between-Reclamation-and-DWR.pdf; Press Release, Agreement
Between U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and California Department of Water Resources Supported by
Public Water Agencies, Westlands Water District (Dec. 12, 2018) https://wwd.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/VA-Joint-Contractor-Press-Release.pdf.
42.
The state of South Australia is at the bottom of the Murray-Darling Basin, an area just over
1 million square kilometers in area with a diverse range of landscapes, ecosystems, land uses, and climates ranging from tropical north to temperate south. The River Murray, measuring 2,500 kilometers
in length, is the longest river in the country and makes up a significant component of the 3,750 kilometer combined Murray-Darling river system. The Basin has, since European settlement, been the source
of many disputes. A good history of the Basin and its problems can be found in DANIEL CONNELL,
WATER POLITICS IN THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN (2007). The Murray-Darling Basin Authority was
established pursuant to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, which appears in Water Act 2007 (Cth)
sch 1 (Austl.). On January 23, 2018 the South Australian state government initiated a Royal Commission to investigate the operations and effectiveness of the Murray-Darling Basin system, an unusual
move given only one-seventh of the basin is within the State’s jurisdiction. The allocation and use of
River Murray water upstream of South Australia and the perception within that state that that was having a deleterious effect on the state’s water supply was a significant issue prompting the establishment
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The modern disputes in California and South Australia stem from the systems
of water law that replaced riparian rights in these very un-English regions. In the
United States, a system known as ‘prior appropriation’ took root in the southern
43
and western states. Some regions adopted a hybrid of riparianism and prior ap44
45
propriation. Australia, along with some American states such as California, es46
tablished a system of “state ownership” that largely replaced riparianism. These
systems sought new ways to allocate the water resource. The prior appropriation
system prioritized the use of water over the attachment of that use to land, while
the state ownership system relied upon the state to allocate use according to need,
47
but typically tied any allocation to an underlying estate in land. Over the last
twenty-five years in Australia, the original adaptation of riparian rights to the arid
climate has undergone further modification, with State governments experimenting with the separation of the water allocation and use right from an underlying
estate in land. While this did not change the appropriative right that resulted from
earlier modifications, it did allow for the transferability of water free of an underly48
ing interest in land.
The American and Australian adaptations have generally worked well. Still,
49
the protection of an allocation in the hands of a grantee—Slater’s certainty —and
the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, both in terms of use and in relation

of the Royal Commission. Details on the Murray-Darling Basin Commission can be found at MurrayDarling Basin Commission, https://www.mdbrc.sa.gov.au/ (last visited July 18, 2019). And in late January 2019, a report by the Australian Productivity Commission suggested that the Murray-Darling Basin
Authority should be broken up, arguing its responsibilities and powers created internal inconsistencies
that were unable to be managed. See PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, MURRAY-DARLING BASIN PLAN: FIVEYEAR ASSESSMENT (Cth) No. 90 (Austl. 2018), https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/basinplan/report/basin-plan.pdf.
43.
See DAVID H GETCHES, WATER LAW (3rd ed. 1997); Water Law: An Overview, THE
NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LAW CENTRE, http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/water-law/ (last
visited June 20, 2019); Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881
(2000).
44.

See Percy, Water Scarcity, supra note 12, at 2095.

45.

CAL. WATER CODE, Stats. 1943, ch. 368, § 102.

46.
See Thorpes Limited v. Grant Pastoral Company Proprietary Limited, (1955) 92 CLR 317
(Austl.); Clark & Renard, supra note 21; D. Patrick James and Hubert Chanson, One Hundred Years+ of
Riparian Legislation in New South Wales, 3 AUSTL. ENVTL. L. NEWS 39 (2000); Sandford D. Clark, The
River Murray Question: Part I – Colonial Days, 8 MELB. U. L. REV. 11 (1971); Sandford D. Clark, The
River Murray Question: Part II – Federation, Agreement and Future Alternatives, 8 MELB. U. L. REV. 215
(1971); Ian A Renard, The River Murray Question: Part III – New Doctrines for Old Problems, 8 MELB. U.
L. REV. 625 (1972). The same modifications were implemented in semi-arid parts of western Canada,
such as Alberta and Saskatchewan: see PERCY, WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION, supra note 12.
47.

See Percy, Water Scarcity, supra note 12, at 2095.

48.

See PAUL T. BABIE, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF TRANSFERABLE WATER
ENTITLEMENT SYSTEMS IN VICTORIA AND ALBERTA (1997).
49.
bility.

See Slater, supra note 9, for a discussion of Slater’s twin objectives of certainty and adapta-
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to the protection of the environment, continue to vex governments. It is the very
nature of defining a certain and adaptable property right in a fugacious resource
that causes problems. Unlike land or tangible personal property, fugacious resources such as water are difficult to “possess” in any traditional sense. The definition of a property right must depend on some other aspect, which has typically resolved itself into an allocation of a given volume of water over a given period of
50
time.
The United States Court of Claims decision in Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, Inc.
51
v. United States demonstrates not only the difficulties involved in establishing water allocations that are both certain and adaptable, but also the passions to which
those difficulties can give rise. In that case, two very divergent routes were taken
by groups claiming proprietary interests in water rights. One group in Oregon took
up arms against the US federal government so as to vindicate their claimed
52
rights. In a dispute focusing on protection of the environment and wildlife,
armed militant ranchers protesting federal control of lands seized control of the
53
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. But in New Mexico, the Sacramento Grazing
54
Association (SGA) sought redress in the US federal courts. There, Judge Braden
held “that SGA established. . . a property interest, recognized by New Mexico law,
to make beneficial use of stock water sources in the Sacramento Allotment of the
55
Lincoln National Forest.” That right “was abrogated by actions undertaken by the
United States Forest Service (“USFS”), in violation of the Takings Clause of the
56
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Disputes such as those in Oregon and New Mexico raise a fundamental question: is property the best way to achieve the objectives of adaptability and certainty
as identified by Slater? This question takes on new significance in respect of the
current vogue, both in the United States and in Australia, for the “unbundling” of
57
entitlements to water. This involves not only the separation of water allocation

50.

ROBERT E. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, VOL. 1, 287-300 (1967).

51.

See Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 168 (2017).

52.

Id. at 171.

53.
See Cat Wise, Cranes, Curlews, And Cows—The Delicate Debate Over Oregon’s Federal Lands,
PBS NEWS (May 24, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/cranes-curlews-and-cows-the-delicatedebate-over-oregons-federal-lands/.
54.
See Josh Buettner, New Mexico ranchers say battle over water rights jeopardizes their livelihood,
PBS NEWS (January 4, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/new-mexico-ranchers-say-battleover-water-rights-jeopardizes-their-livelihood; Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl.
175 (2010).
55.

Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, 135 Fed. Cl. at 171.

56.

Id.

57.
See Michael Young, et. al., Unbundling Water Rights: A Blueprint for Development of Robust
Water Allocation Systems in the Western United States, 15-01 NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y
SOLUTIONS 10-11 (2015).
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from land, but also the further division of the allocation itself for different uses. 58
In other words, there is a further fragmentation—unbundling—of an already fragmented right. Property confers on its holder the power to choose, as mediated by
the public interest, with the state taking the central role in determining what the
public interest is and how to ensure the protection and certainty of the individual
right. But the more fragmented, or unbundled the rights available in the same resource, the more difficult it becomes for any one holder of property—of choice—to
make a decision about the beneficial use of that resource.
In short, government seeks to ensure a balance between private and public in59
terest. That being the case, it becomes important to consider where the state
draws the line between the individual and the community and where the unbundling of water allocations allows that line to be drawn. Such line drawing requires a
framework within which to consider the allocative mechanism implemented. In this
article, we argue that striking that balance means considering the tension between
what Garrett Hardin seminally called the tragedy of the commons and Michael
60
Heller’s ground-breaking revelation of the anticommons tragedy. Somewhere between those two points one finds the optimal balance between individual and
community, between aggregated and disaggregated, or unbundled rights. That is
the theoretical frame that we propose to apply to a system that seeks to allocate water in pursuit of a policy of unbundled rights.
We apply this frame to a case study of the current unbundling process in the
Australian state of South Australia. Still, our approach can be applied to any water
law system in which unbundling has been pursued, informing the definition and
allocation of a proprietary right in water. For example, California is in the process
of implementing modifications to its water allocation law that would allow for a
61
revised groundwater market. In doing so, it should consider the potential for an58.

Id.

59.
See Paul Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-colonialism and the Future: Four Reflections on Private
Property and Climate Change, 19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 527 (2010); see also Paul Babie, Choices that Matter:
Three Propositions on the Individual, Private Property, and Anthropogenic Climate Change, 22 COLO. J. OF
INT’L ENVTL. L. AND POL’Y 323 (2011); see also Paul Babie, Sovereignty as Governance: An Organising
Theme for Australian Property Law, 36 U. OF N.S.W. L. J. 1075 (2013); see also Paul Babie, The Spatial: A
Forgotten Dimension of Property, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 323 (2013).
60.
For the tragedy of the commons, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). And for the tragedy of the anticommons, see Michael A Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621
(1998).
61.
See Dickinson Groundwater Management Act, Cal. Assemb. Bill 1739, Ch. 347 (Cal. Stat.
2014), Pavley Groundwater Management Act, Cal. S. B. 1168, Ch. 346 (Cal. Stat. 2014), and Cal. S. B.
1319, Ch. 346 (Cal. Stat. 2014), collectively known as the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act
(SGMA), Cal. Water Code §10730 (2015). See also Nell Green Nylen et al., Trading Sustainably: Critical
Considerations for Local Groundwater Markets Under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act,
WHEELER WATER INST., CTR. FOR LAW, ENERGY & THE ENV ’T, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. L.
(June 2017), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CLEE_Trading-Sustainably_
2017-06-21.pdf.
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ticommons tragedies that may follow the further fragmentation of an already fragmented resource. Our assessment of South Australia demonstrates that market actors seem reluctant to take up smaller and smaller bundles of rights in relation to
water. We develop, in response, a legal methodological approach for the consideration of water allocation systems in arid and semi-arid environments where the water resource is scarce and where the bundles of rights in that resource are increasingly fragmented.
The article contains three parts. Part I considers the theoretical nature of
property and the way in which it might be extended to water through “unbundling”
of water entitlements. Part II presents unbundling as it has been implemented in
South Australia. This allows us to assess the extent to which the stated policy of
certainty and transferability of entitlements said to be the product of unbundling
has been achieved, and the extent to which this is a desirable outcome. The Conclusion offers some reflections on the potential for unbundling water entitlements
in arid or semi-arid environments. The South Australian experience reveals a reluctance to embrace this approach, both on the part of the state in terms of implementing, and on the part of market actors holding existing proprietary interests in
water. This reluctance ought to be viewed by other jurisdictions as a cautionary tale
about the effectiveness or efficiency of unbundling. Indeed, what we show is that
such efforts may not only fail to provide efficiency gains, but also, and much more
worryingly, may drive anticommons tragedies which entirely inhibit any beneficial
use. We propose that our anecdotal and theoretical analysis of South Australia requires empirical research to test our conclusions, both in respect to the operation of
the water market and as to the behavior of market actors.

I. PROPERTY IN WATER
A. Commons versus Anticommons
A legal system might allocate the use and control of water according to one of
two polar opposite forms of property: either, at one extreme, commons property,
or at the other, private property. In this section we examine not only commons and
private property, but also two specific difficulties that can arise from the use of one
or the other. A ‘tragedy of the commons’ can result from the sole use of commons
62
property, while a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ can follow the extreme fragmenta63
tion of the use of a resource pursuant to private property. We turn first to commons property.
In 1968, Garrett Hardin explored the nature of commons property which, as a
matter of theoretical content, explains the absence of exclusionary rights in respect

62.

Hardin, supra note 60, at 1244.

63.

Heller, supra note 60, at 622.
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of a given resource. 64 Instead, commons property pertains where everyone has the
privilege of use and no one has the right to exclude others in relation to that resource. “People are legally free to do as they wish, and are able to do, with whatev65
er objects (conceivably including persons) are in the [commons].” The protections otherwise afforded the holders of private property are not extended, in the
66
case of commons property, to the resource in question.
One rarely finds the ideal type of commons property identified by Heller in a
67
real-world legal system. Rather, the ideal type demonstrates that in the case of a
true commons in any resource, where no one person has the power to exclude the
use of others, the rational person concludes that it is best to make as much use of
68
the resource as one can before it is depleted by the use of others. Put another
way, there is no benefit to any one person to conserve a resource in a scenario
69
where others are making maximal use of it. Thus, should too many people hold
truly commons property in a scarce resource, without the power to exclude, a trag70
edy of the commons occurs.
71
For Hardin, “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” Hardin would subsequently write that the tragedy arises in the “unmanaged commons”—in other
words, Hardin suggested that a commons may operate efficiently if some regulation is established to govern the use made by those who enjoy access to the commons—which results
because it rewards individual exploiters for making the wrong decisions—
wrong for the group as a whole, and wrong for themselves, in the long
72
run. Freedom in the commons does not produce a stable prosperity.
In some ways, though, what Hardin identified was nothing new. In the Politics,
Aristotle wrote

64.

Hardin, supra note 60, at 1244.

65.

FRANK I. MICHELMAN, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV:
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 5 (J. Rowland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
66.

J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 110 (1996).

67.
The “ideal-typic” and “ideal types” phraseology is coined by Michael A. Heller, Three Faces
of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417, 418, 422, 432-433 (2000). See also Michael A. Heller, The
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. J. 116, 1168 n. 15 (1999).
68.

Hardin, supra note 60, at 1244.

69.

Id.

70.
Heller, supra note 60, at 677 (1998) (“A tragedy of the commons can occur when too many individuals have privileges of use in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively overconsume scarce resources. Each individual finds that she benefits by consumption, even though she imposes larger costs on the community.”)
71.
72.

Hardin, supra note 60, at 1244.

Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons, 9 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY &
EVOLUTION 199, 199 (1994).
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[t]hat which is common to the greatest number is given the least care, for
they care most for that which is their own, and less for that which is
common to all, or they care just for whichever part falls on them individually. Among other reasons, they neglect it even more when they think
that someone else is caring for it, as among the staff of the household,
when sometimes those who give bad service are greater in number than
those who do not. And further, for this reason, each citizen has a thousand sons, these not belonging to each individually, instead being the son
of everyone equally, so that each is neglected with equal measure. 73
In this passage, as in Hardin, we see that the tragedy occurs when the subject enjoys the benefits without the burden of responsibility. Paradoxically, though a person might have an interest in maintaining the condition from which to enjoy the
benefits, the burden does not fall on that person to do so. Therefore, the responsibility is fulfilled by no one.
Averting this tragedy involves ensuring that every person in the commons has
something to protect. The way to do that is to confer upon each person a means of
excluding others from access to and use of the resource said to belong to that per74
son. In other words, the answer is private property: the power, conferred by the
state on individuals, to make use of a resource and to exclude others from that use,
and to alienate that power to others at a time and in a way chosen by the holder of
75
the original power of use and exclusion.
According to Hardin, the best ongoing protection for a resource involves a
76
parcelling out of rights to that resource. Fragmenting a common resource both
spatially (of the resource itself) and legally (as to the rights available to it as protected by law) confers upon individuals the ability to control use and exclude oth77
ers from use. But is such fragmentation, both of the resource and of the power to
exclude from its use, the best outcome available? Others have questioned whether
the adoption of private property represents the sole method of mitigating the trag78
edy of the commons; indeed, even Hardin himself reconsidered his confidence in
79
private property.
In 1998, thirty years after Hardin’s seminal work, Michael Heller suggested a
“mirror image” to the tragedy of the (unregulated) commons—the tragedy of the

73.

ARISTOTLE, POLITICS § 1261b (Kyriaco Nikias trans. 2019).

74.

Hardin, supra note 60, at 1245.

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

See Heller, supra note 60, at 651, for an explanation of the spatial-legal dichotomy.

78.
Lubna Hasan, Fifty Years of Debate on Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons – A Reflection 2, 9-10
(2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3315183 (providing a recent summary of
the positions taken by those who question Hardin’s approach).
79.

See Hardin, supra note 72, at 199.
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anticommons.80 Heller’s work posits a form of property known as “anticommons”
and the tragedy that follows from its surfeit in a legal system. Here we briefly consider these claims in turn.
Consider first the concept of anticommons property. Walking down a postSoviet Moscow street in the late 1990s, Heller noticed empty storefronts, explaining this outcome as the result of circumstances in which
one owner may be endowed initially with the right to sell, another to receive sale revenue, and still others to lease, receive lease revenue, occupy,
and determine use. Each owner can block the others from using the space
as a storefront. No one can set up shop without collecting the consent of
81
all of the other owners.
This represents a case of anticommons property, in which “initial endowments are
created as disaggregated rights rather than as coherent bundles of rights in scarce
resources . . . . In an anticommons . . . multiple owners are each endowed with the
right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege
82
of use.”
We might consider anticommons property as private property on steroids: “a
property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a
83
scarce resource,” inhibiting effective and efficient use. The most extreme form of
anticommons private property is that pertaining to pharmaceutical patents—many
individual holders enjoy a right of exclusion in relation to a different component of
one pharmaceutical product. The multiple rights of exclusion mean that no one patent holder can effectively and efficiently develop the pharmaceutical product, thus
denying both the patent-holders of the financial benefit of the right held, and the
84
market of a potentially beneficial medicine. Yet, “for most resources that people
care about, some level of use is preferable to non-use, and an anticommons regime
85
is a threat to, rather than the epitome of, optimal use.” We might plot what we
know about commons property, private property and anticommons property along
a continuum, as seen in Figure 1.

80.
Heller, supra note 60. Michael Heller fully developed the concept of the anticommons tragedy in MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2010).
81.

Heller, supra note 60, at 623.

82.

Id. at 623-24.

83.

Id. at 667 (emphasis in original removed).

84.

HELLER, supra note 80, at 49-78.

85.

Heller, supra note 60, at 669.
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FIGURE 1. CONTINUUM OF PRIVATE PROPERTY86

As one plots a system of property towards the anticommons end of the continuum, what one really finds is a highly fragmented system of private property
rights in one resource. At this end of the continuum, what Heller calls “extreme
private property” in the diagram, full exclusion refers to the fact that actor A, B, C,
etc., has a full exclusionary right in relation to one discrete element of the resource
symbolized by the full cell. This contrasts with the commons end of the continuum, in which the absence of private property means that each of A, B, C, etc., has
no right to exclude any others entitled to make use of the commons, again represented by the full cell. When a situation at the anticommons end emerges in relation to a given resource, either as a consequence of the state creating and conferring private property, or of individuals dividing existing private property interests,
the potential for what Heller calls an anticommons tragedy looms. “When there are
too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a
87
tragedy of the anticommons.” Here, then, “too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively waste the resource by underconsuming it compared with a
88
social optimum.” Moreover, and more worrying,
[o]nce anticommons property appears, neither markets nor subsequent
regulation will reliably convert it into useful private property, even if the
property rights are “clearly defined” and contracts are subject to the “rule
of law.” Transaction costs, holdouts, and rent-seeking may prevent economically justified conversion from taking place. Over time, markets may
develop formal or informal mechanisms that allow rights bundling entrepreneurs to assemble private or quasi-private property. More directly,
governments can tinker with the rights regime through policy reforms to
change individual incentives in favor of bundling, or they can risk the instability that comes from revoking excessive rights of exclusion. Howev-

86.

Adapted from Heller, supra note 67, at 1167.

87.

Heller, supra note 60, at 624 (emphasis in original).

88.

Id. at 677.
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er . . . once anticommons property has emerged, both markets and governments may fail to rebundle it into usable private property.89
It is for this reason, Heller argues, that
[g]overnments must take care to avoid creating anticommons property accidentally when they define new property rights. One path to wellfunctioning private property is to convey a core bundle of rights to a single owner, rather than rights of exclusion to multiple owners. Subsequently, owners of standard bundles may fragment their ownership. Wellfunctioning market legal systems allow this conversion, but have numerous safeguard mechanisms to ensure that rights can be rebundled and the
property can be put to use within a reasonable period. When these mechanisms fail, anticommons property can become entrenched, even in developed market economies.90
The difficulty is that
[b]oth theorists and practitioners assume that the key to creating private
property is to define rights clearly, enforce contracts predictably, and let
the market sort out entitlements. The experience of anticommons property . . . suggests that the content of property bundles, and not just the clarity of property rights, matters more than we have realized. We pay a high
price when we inadvertently create anticommons property. 91
Heller’s conclusions about anticommons property and the potential for a tragedy of underuse stand in stark contrast to the trend of Australian policy, legal, and
scholarly opinion about the packaging of proprietary rights in water. The Australian objective seems to be an unbundling of property rights or entitlements to this
92
scarce resource. This unbundling seems to be the very circumstance that will ensure not that the resource will be used efficiently, but rather that it will not be used
at all. While it is uncertain that a tragedy either of the commons or of the anticommons will occur simply because either commons or anticommons property ex93
ists, as we show in Part II, the risk of such a tragedy following the emergence of
these types of property is significant, and the consequences dire.
Hardin and Heller stake out positions at either end of a very wide spectrum—
they theorize two different types of property and two different types of tragedy. At
Hardin’s end of the spectrum we find commons property and the tragedy of the

89.

Id. at 687-88.

90.

Id. at 688.

91.

Id.

92.
See infra Section II.A (describing Australia’s evolving approach to the unbundling of water
rights between 2004 and 2012).
93.

HELLER, supra note 80, at 676-78.
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commons. At Heller’s end, anticommons property, or more accurately, hyperprivate property and the anticommons tragedy.
Of course, almost no cases of a perfect commons or of an anticommons property system will ever be found in any real-world scarce resource. As we have noted,
they are ideal types. The point, though, is that a system of property or entitlement
in a scarce resource will require pegging somewhere along that spectrum. Making
the decision as to where to place those entitlements carries consequences for the
use of that resource. That pegging is really another way of saying that a decision
has to be made between prioritizing the individual—at the Heller end—and the
94
collective or community—the Hardin end. Too far towards the commons end of
the spectrum and wasteful use will occur; too far towards the anticommons end and
the opposite, a complete lack of any use whatsoever, follows. As we show in the
next section, and in Part II, this tension is perhaps most marked in the debate over
bundling or unbundling allocations in water. The question is a simple one: have
governments that have engaged in unbundling achieved the correct blend of proprietary entitlements, taking account of the commons and anticommons tragedies
at either end of the property continuum? Through an assessment of the legislative,
policy, and anecdotal evidence, we explore the extent to which unbundling has
been achieved in Australian water law, using South Australia as a case study. We
then examine the extent to which this development carries with it the potential for
an anticommons tragedy.

B. Bundled versus Unbundled
The tension between commons and anticommons property plays out in relation to the current trend away from bundled entitlements to water. As we noted in
the Introduction, for the most part, government-established and enforced waterallocation systems seek to balance two competing goals. They work to separate water allocations from the necessity of owning land while avoiding commons property
95
and its attendant difficulties. Most modern water-allocation systems respond to
circumstances—sometimes found in prior-appropriation systems—in which conflict
among users and inefficient use by those users ensues from a lack of clarity over the
96
rights held. Governments intervene so as to encourage markets in water and to
97
ensure the viability and functioning of those markets.
It comes as no surprise, then, as we have shown in Part I, that most governments move away from commons property as concerns water allocation, and towards systems of private property in water. In doing so, such water allocation systems move along the continuum outlined above towards anticommons property.

94.

See Hardin, supra note 72, at 199; see also Heller, supra note 60, at 623-24.

95.

See supra Introduction.

96.

See Young, supra note 57, at 1.

97.

See id. at 7.
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Unbundling, as we have discussed above,98 seeks simultaneously to define the entitlement to water and its separation into constituent parts, making it, so it is
99
claimed, “easier to value, monitor, and trade:”
In an unbundled system, the component of a water right that defines the
long-term interest is defined as a share. The water that is available for use
within a time period (e.g., year or season) is then defined as a seasonal allocation. A share can be thought of as a perpetual entitlement to a portion
of any water that is allocated for use. A seasonal allocation can be thought
of as an acre foot of water available in a particular season. In an unbundled system, this acre foot can be used, traded, or, with adjustment for
losses, saved for use in a subsequent season. The number of seasonal allocations a person receives is a function of the number of shares he or she
holds in that particular water resource. When an allocation is made, it is
recorded in a water account, but not recorded on a share certificate. 100
“Priority shares” within the system ensure that those who hold allocations prior to unbundling retain that priority, and “seasonal or annual allocations” are made
101
according to the number of shares held. Thus, shares and allocation are separated, which “enables two forms of trading: (1) share trading, which facilitates efficient management of risk and investment and (2) allocation trading, which ensures
102
that all water is put to its best economic use.”
A key component of an unbundled allocation of water is the absence of a 100%
beneficial use requirement. Rather, a clearly-defined water right may allow a holder
of an allocation to use it (either in its entirety or not), save it, or sell it, each de103
pending upon seasonal conditions and circumstances. Water resource sharing
plans make clear how water is to be used, leaving little to judgement and dispute
104
requiring judicial resolution. Established by water boards (which remove much
105
dispute-resolution from courts), such plans “must address how much water must
be (1) set aside for conveyance and meeting of downstream obligations, (2) allocated to shareholders, and (3) defined as flood water and, hence, not held as a
106
right.” In addition to this, such plans make provision for water that is to be re107
tained in system for the environment. Bolstering the certainty achieved by re-

98.
99.
100.

See supra Section I.A.
Young, supra note 57, at 11.
Id.

101.

Id.

102.

Id. at 12.

103.

Id. at 11, 16-17.

104.

Id. at 12.

105.

Id. at 22-23.

106.

Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).

107.

Id. at 19-21.
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source sharing plans, a Torrens Title-like register of water entitlements allows for
ease of determining the holder of relevant water entitlements, and for establishing
108
priority amongst them and for facilitating their transfer.
The question, of course, is whether the policy of unbundling works—does it
move too far along the continuum of property, thus running the risk of a tragedy of
the anticommons? In partial answer to that question (partial, for reasons we will
see), we turn now to the legal implementation of the theory and policy of unbundling in South Australia.

II. UNBUNDLING WATER ENTITLEMENTS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA
The climate of the Australian continent is varied, though it is for the most part
characteristically dry. Though an extensive agricultural economy developed in the
colonial period, the rainfall upon which it depends can be unreliable. Droughts are
109
frequent and severe. The Australian condition is captured most famously in the
works of the nation’s foremost novelist, Patrick White. The landscape serves White
as a device for exploration of the theme of reckoning with hardship, as when, gazing helplessly into the sky above her rural property, one of his characters ponders
that
[t]here would be rain perhaps, she felt.

110

But White’s surreality has been the harsh actuality of the Australian condition for
generations of agriculturalists. This is especially true of South Australia, the vast
111
majority of which is either arid or semi-arid.

108.
Id. at 13-15. Torrens title is a system of title to land by registration, whereby an estate or
interest in land is created not by deed, as at common law, but through a legislatively defined process of
registration. A system of title by registration, such as the Torrens title system, seeks to achieve three
primary objectives: (i) establishing a register in which any person can determine the state of title to a
given landholding simply be searching the register—this is known as the ‘mirror principle’, in the sense
that the register provides an accurate ‘reflection’ of the state of title, (ii) drawing a ‘curtain’ around all
prior dealings with the land, so that a person dealing in the land is bound only by those interests noted
on the register at the relevant time—the ‘curtain principle’—and, (iii) a state guarantee of title, such
that any person who suffers loss as a consequence of reliance on the register or as a result of the operation of the register may recover that loss from the state—the ‘guarantee principle’. The Torrens title
system was created in South Australia in 1858 and has subsequently been adopted throughout Australia,
most of Canada, and some other jurisdictions internationally, including some U.S. States. See John V.
Orth & Paul T. Babie, The Troubled Boundaries of Torrens Indefeasibility: Lessons from Australia and the
United States, 7 PROP. L. REV. 33 (Australia) (2017) (outlining systems of land title by registration, the
origins of the Torrens system, and its spread to other jurisdictions).
109.
Climate
Change
and
Drought,
CLIMATE
COUNCIL
(June
2018),
https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CC_MVSA0146-Fact-Sheet-Drought_
V2-FA_High-Res_Single-Pages.pdf.
110.

PATRICK WHITE, THE TREE OF MAN 63 (1956).

111.
Trevor Griffin & Murray McCaskill (eds) Atlas of South Australia, South Australian Government Printing Division and Wakefield Press 1986 at 50-51.
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A. Policy
The state of South Australia has the unenviable title of being the driest state
112
on the driest inhabited continent on earth. The latest State of Environment report for South Australia paints a bleak picture for a state that already has water
113
scarcity issues from time to time. “South Australia’s surface water and groundwater resources are under pressure from agriculture, industrial use, population
114
growth, pollution, and climate change.”
Since 1990, the state has exhibited significant regional variation in rainfall
trends. Winter rainfall has decreased in the state’s key southern agricultural regions
by around 10−40 mm per decade, while tropically induced summer rainfall has increased in the northern pastoral regions by up to 40−60 mm per decade. Although
there has been some increase in extreme rainfall events, particularly in the state’s
north, annual and spring rainfall across South Australia is projected to decline by
115
between 5−15% by 2050 (relative to the baseline period 1986–2005).
There is a strong reliance on both the River Murray for industry, irrigation,
and water supply to the state’s major city, Adelaide, and on groundwater supplies
116
in the rural sector and rural towns. If the limited useable sources of water are to
be available for use by both present and future generations and for environmental
117
purposes, they must be rigorously managed with care and considerable foresight.
The systems set up under the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (South Australia (SA)) for the licensing and approval of rights in relation to water are designed to assist with the process of ensuring both present and future generations of
South Australians have access to adequate water supplies. They clearly contemplate
118
an unbundled approach to those water rights.
In 2012, the South Australian government issued its Policy on the Implementation of Unbundling Water Rights in South Australia, the stated purpose of which was
“[t]o set out the principles and processes for determining the appropriate level and
timing of unbundling of water rights for each prescribed water resource” and thus
“respond to requirements for water planning under the COAG Water Reform
112.
River Murray, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., DEP’T FOR ENV ’T
https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/river-murray (last visited July 19, 2019).

AND

WATER,

113.
S. AUSTL. ENV’T PROTECTION AUTH., STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT 1-52 (7th
ed. 2018) https://www.epa.sa.gov.au/soe-2018.
114.

Id. at 27.

115.

Id. at 15.

116.
River Murray, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., DEP’T FOR ENV ’T
https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/river-murray (last visited July 19, 2019).
117.

AND

WATER,

See Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative, ¶ 2, 2010.

118.
Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA). This unbundled approach was set up under
Part 3 of the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 following amendments made to that Act by the
Natural Resources Management (Water Resources and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2007. The amendments were made, in part, to meet the State of South Australia’s obligations pursuant to the 1994 Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative.
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agenda, National Water Initiative (NWI), in particular the NWI Guidelines for
Water Planning and Management, as well as the Water Resource Plan Require119
ments in the Basin Plan.” The first step in this process involved amendments to
120
the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) which came into force on 1 July
2009. The Act allows for five defined water entitlements, collectively defined by
121
the generic term, “water management authorisation:” (i) water access entitle122
123
124
ments, (ii) water allocations, (iii) delivery capacity entitlements, (iv) water
125
126
resource works approvals, and (v) site use approvals. The first three entitlements were stated to be personal property, freely transferable as such, while the
127
latter two remained attached to land.
In the 2012 Policy, however, the government stated that it had been “determined that apart from regulated river systems the applicability and benefits of un128
bundling water rights are less obvious.” The government noted that a number of
questions remained about unbundling, namely

119.
GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., POLICY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNBUNDLING WATER
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA 1 (2012), https://www.waterconnect.sa.gov.au/Content/Publications/
DEWNR/Policy%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20Unbundling%20Water%20Rights
%20in%20South%20Australia.pdf.
120.
Pursuant to the Natural Resources Management (Water Resources and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2007 (South Australia). See also Natural Resources Management (General) Regulations 2005 (South
Australia).
121.

Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 3.

122.
This is a water license providing an entitlement to the holder of the license to gain access to
a share of water available in the consumptive pool or consumptive pools to which the license relates. See
id. at s 146.
123.
A water allocation is the amount of water that may be allocated to a particular license holder
in relation to a defined water resource. See id. at s 152.
124.
A delivery capacity entitlement is an entitlement held by a person enabling the transfer of
the subject water to another under a water entitlements transfer scheme. See id. at s 164(k).
125.
A water resource works approval is an approval for works and infrastructure related to the
extraction and supply of water through bores, pumps, pipes, etc. See id. at s 159.
126.
A site use approval is an approval specifying the purposes for which the water can be used,
the place at which it can be used and the proposed extent, manner and rate of use of the water. For example, the use of water supplied for irrigation purposes may be restricted to certain types of irrigation
such as drip irrigation and night watering as a water conservation measure during the summer. See id. at
s 164(a).
127.
GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., supra note 119, at 2. See also GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., DEP’T OF ENV’T,
WATER AND NAT. RESOURCES, UNBUNDLING WATER RIGHTS - GENERAL INFORMATION (2009),
https://www.waterconnect.sa.gov.au/Content/Publications/DEWNR/Unbundling%20Water%20Rights
%20FAQ.pdf [hereinafter U NBUNDLING WATER RIGHTS - GENERAL INFORMATION].
128.
GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., supra note 119, at 2. (“South Australia is committed to implementation of unbundling for surface water, watercourses and groundwater systems, where demonstrated to be
feasible and of overall net benefit, in consultation with stakeholders on a case by case basis.”). The River
Murray is just one of a number of regulated river systems across Australia. See, River Murray, GOV’T OF
S. AUSTL., DEP’T FOR ENV’T AND WATER., https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/river-murray
(last visited July 19, 2019).

_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2019]

Property in Water: A Cautionary Tale From Australia

2/25/2020 4:03 PM

129

•

Are there gaps in knowledge about the water resource that impact on
determining consumptive pool boundaries?
• What are the required water resource management arrangements and
are they better supported by unbundling water rights?
• Does unbundling streamline or complicate water resource management, water rights administration and processes for water users?
• Does unbundling facilitate water markets and water trade? This may
depend on the complexity of water resource management issues, but
can also depend on the maturity of the market and the level of understanding and confidence of the licensees. In addition, any assessment should consider any advantages from expediting trade.
• To what extent are other prescribed water resources within the same
region unbundled?
• To what extent are inter-catchment or inter-basin water transfers occurring and what is the impact of potential different management arrangements between these catchments?
• Are there other outstanding issues that may need to be resolved prior
to the introduction of unbundled water rights—such as conversion to
volumetric allocations, addressing overallocation, dealing with unlicensed water use, such as stock and domestic water use, or interception and use by forestry?
• Are there intergovernmental issues that need to be considered, such
129
as the Border Groundwater Agreement, and the benefits of consistency with interstate arrangements?
• What are the current administrative practices and how will they have
to change under an unbundled water rights system? Are there barri130
ers in terms of costs, skills, IT systems, etc.?
For these reasons, while unbundling has occurred in the River Murray Prescribed
Watercourse and the Southern Basins and Musgrave Prescribed Wells Area (see
131
Figure 2 for the South Australian water resource management areas), full unbundling across the state has yet to proceed. In the following section, we consider
129.
The Border Groundwater Agreement is an agreement between the Australian states of Victoria and South Australia. Along the border between the two states the only reliable source of water is
groundwater. It is used for irrigation, industrial, stock and domestic supply and is the principal source
of water for some of the townships in the border region. The Agreement seeks to ensure that the available groundwater is shared equitably between the two states in an area that extends for 20 kilometers on
either side of the border for a distance of 450 kilometers. Border Groundwaters Agreement - South Australia-Victoria, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/water/resources/bordergroundwaters-agreement (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
130.
GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., supra note 119, at 4. See generally, UNBUNDLING WATER RIGHTS GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 127.
131. Unbundling Water Rights, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/managingnatural-resources/water/planning/water-licences-and-permits/unbundling-water-rights (last visited July 19,
2019).
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the legal framework of unbundling pursuant to the Natural Resources Management
Act 2004 (SA), including subsequent amendments to the Act made in 2007 to implement the requirements of the National Water Initiative.

B. Commonwealth Impetus: National Water Initiative 2004
The allocation and regulation of water has been a problem in Australian law
132
since the foundation of central governments after colonization. The problem of
133
allocation is inherently one of the transferability of rights. The Roman legacy of
riparian rights in English law was wholly unsuitable for the dry continent, since it
restricted the allocation of rights to water to those who held the land on which the
134
water was located, or to which it was connected. Water in Australia was not as
abundant as it was in England, so the riparian doctrine created an irregular and inefficient distribution of access to the resource. It was clear from the establishment
of the first farms in the colonies that water rights on the continent would have to
be severed from rights in land in order to achieve an efficient allocation of the resource for agricultural use. An early attempt at centralizing the allocation of water
135
rights is seen in the Victorian Irrigation Act 1886 (Victoria (Vic)) which put rights
in the use of water from a watercourse in the hands of the state, thus subordinating
136
the rights of riparian landholders.
It took another century for the principle of the severance of water rights from
137
land to be extended to water generally, rather than watercourses alone. The first
step in the reform of Australian water rights was the 1994 Council of Australian
138
Governments (‘CoAG’) Water Reform Framework. It was agreed by the state
governments that they
would implement comprehensive systems of water allocations or entitlements backed by separation of water property rights from land title and
clear specification of entitlements in terms of ownership, volume, reliabil139
ity, transferability and, if appropriate, quality . . .

132.

See Clark, supra note 46.

133.

See BABIE, supra note 48.

134.
On modern riparian doctrine and its history, see supra notes 42-46 and associated text. See
also GETZLER, supra note 5, at 2.
135.

Irrigation Act of 1886, 50 Vict. No. 898 (1886).

136.

See JOHN TISDELL, JOHN WARD, AND TONY GRUDZINSKI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
WATER REFORM IN AUSTRALIA (TECHNICAL REPORT 02/5), 16 (Cooperative Research Centre for
Catchment Hydrology, 2002).
137.

See BABIE, supra note 48.

138.

COUNCIL OF AUSTL. GOV’TS, WATER REFORM FRAMEWORK COMMUNIQUÉ 25
FEBRUARY 1994, (Environment Australia, Marine and Water Division, 2004) http://www.ielrc.org/
content/e9401.pdf.
139.

Id. at s 4(a).
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The 1994 agreement is properly placed in the context of the liberalization of
140
Australian macroeconomic policy in the 1980s. The reforms having exposed domestic industry to foreign competition, the Government was concerned with mak141
ing Australian production efficient enough to compete with foreign industry. It
142
was important to achieve the allocative efficiency of business inputs. Water was
one such input, with particular importance for agricultural production, which is by
143
far the largest use for water in Australia. The problem inherited from English
law was that riparian rights created a rigid market for water (being connected with
land), and so distorted the efficient allocation and use of water by irrigators and
pastoralists. The economic effects put Australian production at a disadvantage.
And this problem only became increasingly serious as “[m]arginally increasing
costs of supply were exacerbated by an increasing demand for water resources, both
in scale and diversity, particularly community demand for in-stream environmental
144
objectives and consumer concern for improved quality of supply.” The CoAG
agreement in 1994 sought to address the situation by creating a more competitive,
145
integrated national water market. Thus, the creation of rights to water separated
from rights to land (that is, the effective abolition of pure riparian doctrine) had the
aim of maximising national income and welfare “within the social, physical and
146
ecological constraints of catchments.”
In a way that neatly characterizes the relationship between the Australian
states and the Federation, the Federal Government in 1995 tied the payment of
transfers to the states (under the National Competition Policy) to their implemen147
tation of the principles of the CoAG agreement. In order to fulfil their obligation (and thus to secure the competitive funding), legislative reforms were passed

140.

See TISDELL, WARD AND GRUDZINSKI, supra note 136, at 25.

141.

Id. at 26.

142.

See id. at 32, 34–35.

143.
2018).
144.

See ALEXANDER WALTER GARDNER ET AL., WATER RESOURCES LAW, 12–16 (2nd ed.
TISDELL, WARD AND GRUDZINSKI, supra note 136, at 19 (citations omitted).

145.

COUNCIL OF AUSTL. GOV’TS, supra note 138.

146.

Id., cl 5(a).

147.
GARDNER ET AL., supra note 143, at 47–48. It is worth noting that the relationship between
the states and the Federal Government in Australia is different in several ways to that in the United
States of America. The difference is often characterised as one between a collaborative and complementary federation of states in Australia and “competitive federalism” in America. But the American characteristic may, in fact, better describe the Australian condition in respect of the issue of government funding. The Federal Government may often tie its promise of funding for a state to its expectation of the
fulfilment of a mutual obligation, as was the case in this example. The obligation often requires the state
to legislate or enforce a reform that it had been hitherto reluctant to pursue. An analogy may be made to
the relationship between the central authorities of the European Union and the legislatures of its member states.
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by all the states and territories by the end of the millennium.148 The legislation
amended the common law position such that riparian rights were subject to prescribed limitations, and created ministerial powers for the regulation and restriction of water use.
One decade later, there was a second call for reforms, prompted by the “increase in demand for water . . . [the] increased understanding of the management
needs of surface and groundwater systems . . . [and] an enhanced understanding of
149
the requirements for effective and efficient water markets.” This culminated in
150
the 2004 Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative (NWI).
This agreement was not legally binding, nor were its principles enforced by the
151
threat of withheld federal money as with the CoAG agreement a decade earlier.
Yet the states did respond to it with legislative reforms, though as we shall see,
152
they have been only partially implemented. The NWI adopted the principle of
153
unbundled rights from the CoAG, and elaborated on the content of water licenses and the process by which they could be traded and enforced. It called on the parties to adopt certain features of “water access entitlements,” including that they
would
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

specify the essential characteristics of the water product;
be exclusive;
be able to be traded, given, bequeathed or leased;
be able to be subdivided or amalgamated;
be mortgageable (and in this respect have similar status as freehold
land when used as collateral for accessing finance);
(vi) be enforceable and enforced; and
(vii) be recorded in publicly-accessible reliable water registers that foster
public confidence and state unambiguously who owns the entitle154
ment, and the nature of any encumbrances on it . . . .

The NWI made it clear that any allocations of water to a water access entitle155
ment had to be consistent with a water plan. Clause 36 of the NWI recognizes
the importance of water plans for the management of both surface and groundwater. It also highlights the important role they play in assisting governments and the
148.
Water Resources Act 1998 (ACT); Water Management Act 2000 (NSW); Water Act 2000 (Qld);
Water Resources Act 1997 (SA); Water Management Act 1999 (Tas); Rights in Water and Irrigation Amendment Act 2000 (WA). Victoria and the Northern Territory had earlier already passed their own legislation: Water Act 1992 (NT); Water Act 1989 (Vic).
149.

Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative, supra note 117, at ¶ 4.

150.

Id.

151.

On the lack of an enforcement mechanism, see GARDNER ET AL., supra note 143, at 50–52.

152.

See infra Section II.C.

153.

Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative, supra note 117, at ¶ 28.

154.

Id. at ¶ 31.

155.

Id. at ¶ 29.
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community to make water management and allocation decisions, and thereby to
reach the productive environmental and social objectives. There is specific recognition of the fact that there should be separate regulatory approvals for each element
of the water access arrangements in clause 30, which in turn refers to a set of
“Principles for regulatory approvals for water use and works” contained in schedule
D of the NWI. Those principles seek to ensure that regulatory approvals enabling
water use at a particular site for a purpose are consistent with relevant water and
156
157
planning legislation and policy and water plans. They should take into account
158
the environmental social and economic impacts of use, contain clear condi159
160
tions, minimize the applicant’s costs of application and compliance, and pro161
vide avenues for appeal of decisions.
In South Australia, the NWI prompted the enactment of the Natural Resources
Management Act 2004 (SA) and later amendments to the Act passed in 2007. We
turn now to an analysis of those provisions.

C. State Implementation: Natural Resources Management Act 2004
The NWI agreement sought the establishment of “water plans,” that is, the
central planning of water allocation, so that entitlements to water use would be dis162
tributed consistent with “productive, environmental and social objectives.”
While the agreement failed to address the inherent tension between productive and
environmental objectives, it sought to regulate the approval of water access enti163
tlements, so that—in most states and territories, including South Australia —the
164
entitlements must not be granted unless they are consistent with the plan.
The Government of South Australia has “prescribed” ninety per cent of water
165
resources in the state. Prescription allows the central planning of water allocation, and so the regulation of tradeable rights. However, the process of unbundling
water rights in South Australia has yet to be completed. When the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) (NRM) was passed, and when it was amended in

156.

Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(i).

157.

Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(ii).

158.

Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(iii).

159.

Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(iv).

160.

Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(v).

161.

Id. at Sched. D ¶ 1(viii).

162.

Id. at ¶ 36.

163.

GARDNER ET AL., supra note 143, at 247-48.

164.
In South Australia, the relevant provisions are Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA)
ss 124(7), 127(2).
165.
S. AUSTL. DEP’T OF WATER, LAND, BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION, SOUTH
AUSTRALIA’S WATER FUTURE, 8 (2006).
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2007, it was expected that all water rights would be unbundled by 2014.166 In late
2017, the Productivity Commission reported that rights to surface water in South
Australia—where they are separate from land, as in regulated watercourses—have
167
so far been unbundled only in the Murray–Darling Basin. Groundwater rights
remain bundled everywhere in the state, other than in the Southern Basins and
Musgrave Prescribed Wells management area on the Eyre Peninsula (see Figure
168
2). The Productivity Commission reported that
South Australia is. . . updating its Policy Statement: Implementation of Unbundling Water Rights in South Australia to identify opportunities to ensure
the implementation of unbundled water rights supports quicker, simpler
169
and more pragmatic water allocation planning.
This policy statement has yet to be updated.170 It has been suggested that the relatively limited trade in water outside the Murray–Darling Basin may be “attributed
171
to factors such as water rights remaining bundled.” Conversely, lower preexisting trade activity in those regions may have weakened the impetus for establishing and reforming the system of trade.
As already described, the NWI contemplated that all states would unbundle
172
water rights. South Australian legislation, like that of other states, set up arrangements for the use and licensing of water with separate approvals or permits
173
for each component. The key provisions of the Act itself do not contemplate a
174
continuation of a bundled water rights system. However, to accommodate a system where water rights had been bundled for many years, transitional arrangements were necessary, as found in the Natural Resources Management (Water Resources and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2007 (SA). Section 5 of that Act provides
for the continuation of bundled licensing arrangements unchanged “until the min175
ister otherwise determines.” These provisions are elaborated and repeated in
regulation 47 of the Natural Resources Management (General) Regulations 2005

166.
S. AUSTL. OFFICE FOR WATER SECURITY, WATER FOR GOOD: A PLAN TO ENSURE OUR
WATER FUTURE TO 2050, 169 (2010).
167.

AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, NATIONAL WATER REFORM, 339 (2017).

168.

Id.

169.

AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 167, at 341.

170.
The latest policy statement was issued in 2012. See S. AUSTL. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WATER
AND NAT. RES., POLICY STATEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNBUNDLING WATER RIGHTS
IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA (2012).
171.
D.J. McKane & I. Franssen, An Adaptive Approach to Water Rights Reform in South Australia,
in WATER RESOURCES MGMT. VII 61, 65 (C.A. Brebbia ed., 2013).
172.
See National Water Initiative, supra note 117, at ¶ 63 (demonstrating agreement between
several states that provides for unbundling practices).
173.

Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 3.

174.

Id.

175.

Id. at s 5(2)(a)-(b).
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(SA). The regulations were meant to expire in 2016. 176 However, their expiration
date was extended to 1 September 2019, presumably because of the slow pace at
which the unbundling of water licenses had already occurred.

176.
In South Australia, under the provisions of s 16(1)(g) of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1978
(SA), regulations made after 1 January 1987 will expire after a period of 10 years. The expiry can be
postponed for between 2 to 4 years: s 16C(1). The purpose of this provision is to ensure regular review
and updating of delegated legislation.
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FIGURE 2. WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AREAS OF
177
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 2010

177.
The diagram draws upon S. AUSTL. DEP’T FOR ENV ’T. AND WATER (2018). Illustration ©
Nigel Williams 2019 (used with permission).
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The situation remains uncertain because the state Liberal government in
South Australia was elected in March 2018 on a platform that included reform of
178
the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA). A proposal for a new Landscapes South Australia Act (which would repeal the Natural Resources Management
179
Act) was released for public comment in July 2018. A report following that con180
sultation was released, and it was anticipated that the draft bill would be put be181
fore the South Australian Parliament in 2019. It appears that the reforms will
largely be to the structure and form of the administrative bodies established to
manage natural resources. There is little substantive change to water management.
The legislative reform therefore seems to resolve little of the uncertainty that presently exists regarding the future of the unbundling process.

D. Balance Between Bundled and Unbundled
The unbundling of water rights from land has been described as the “lynchpin
182
of water reform.” Unbundling of water rights “can increase trading opportunities
and thus provide water users with greater flexibility to manage their water access,
183
use, delivery and land-holding needs.” It is meant to result in more efficient water use and improve the system for water trading. However, unbundling is not
without its detractors. Some see the whole process as equating to the privatization
of water, which they believe is “incompatible with the protection of water as a pub184
lic good.” And concerns are particularly poignant in the agricultural sector,
where users need water to irrigate a range of produce including wine, orchards and
185
vegetables. The real question, here, though, is whether the policy of unbundling
followed in South Australia has the unintended result of producing the potential
for an anticommons tragedy. Our assessment in this section of the available anecdotal evidence suggests that the risk of an anticommons tragedy is a real one.

178.
Natural Resources Management – Empowering Communities, LIBERAL PARTY SOUTH
AUSTRALIA (2018), https://strongplan.com.au/policy/natural-resources-management/.
179.
We’re Changing NRM in South Australia, YOURSAY, https://yoursay.sa.gov.au/decisions/
landscape-reform/consultation_process (last visited June 23, 2018).
180.
BECKY HURST CONSULTING, MANAGING OUR LANDSCAPES: CONVERSATIONS FOR
CHANGE (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/files/sharedassets/public/get_involved/
managing-our-landscapes-summary.pdf.
181.
GOV’T OF S. AUSTL.,
management (last visited June 6, 2019).

https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/topics/natural-resources-

182.
Ian Douglas, Water Wars: The Battle Between Public and Private, ABC NEWS OPINION (May
26, 2011), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-26/douglaswater/2731364.
183.
ADVICE, 43

AUSTL. COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM’N, WATER TRADING RULES – FINAL
(2010).

184.

Douglas, supra note 182.

185.

See BECKY HURST CONSULTING, supra note 180, at 57.
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In the discussion paper issued with proposals for a new Landscapes South Australia Act, consultants noted that while water management reform was not a significant component of the first tranche of the legislative review it was nevertheless a
topic that the broader community consistently raised as an issue in their submis186
sions to the enquiry. Water allocations, water security, water availability, and
187
sustainable water management were issues of particular concern. More monitor188
ing and regulation of water use was seen as important. Concern was expressed
about unbundling as well, with one natural resources management board submitting that the requirement to unbundle water rights would lead to more complex
189
and cumbersome water allocation plans. The environmental NGO, Trees for
Life, recommended a review of unbundling of water rights in the new legislation,
arguing that “[u]nbundling can work for water assets in a large system like the
190
Murray River but not necessarily for other systems.” Experience may bear this
out, as demonstrated by the limited implementation of unbundling over South
191
Australia’s other water resources to date.
In its policy on the implementation of unbundling water rights in South Australia, the South Australian state government outlined some of the “significant
benefits” that can be created by the unbundling of water rights. They include
• Clarification of the ownership attributes of water as separate from
the commitments and obligations associated with its taking and use,
• Improved ability to trade water rights both within South Australia
and between South Australia and other States,
• Faster processing times that will provide greater certainty and flexibility in the management of water portfolios,
• The ability more easily to trade the seasonal volume of water independently of the ongoing water right (the water access entitlement),
and
• Greater flexibility in the options for managing water including deal192
ing with variability in a water resource.
To these can be added:
•

193

The rules on extraction would not be directly linked to changes in
entitlements or allocations, and therefore the value of the asset would

186.

See id. at 56.

187.

See id.

188.

See id. at 57.

189.

Id.

190.

Id.

191.

Supra, Section II.C.

192.

GOV’T OF S. AUSTL., supra note 119, at 1.

193.
Unpublished Notes of Paul Leadbeter, Member, Tatiara Water Allocation Plan Review
Stakeholder Advisory Group (on file with author) (notes based on meetings of the Group during 2018).
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not be affected. The asset is the entitlement to a certain amount of
water. Conditions that restrict or limit its use or extraction may reduce its attraction as a tradable or transferable asset.
Management rules that relate to each water management authorization can be better separated and dealt with in separate components of
the relevant water allocation plan, which eases transferability. For
example, with transfer of a bundled license, consideration has to be
given to any restrictions on the water allocation imposed by conditions governing extraction of the water or its use. In an unbundled
system, if someone simply purchases a water allocation, they have no
inherent restriction on the extraction of that water or how or where it
is used. The purchaser will need to seek his or her own water management authorizations to enable the purchaser to extract and use the
water allocation they have purchased. Conditions restricting how and
where water can be used, which are often attached to a bundled water
license, can significantly limit the potential use of the allocation and
lower its value as an asset.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in its “Final advice on water trading rules” noted another possible advantage
194
of unbundling. Sometimes a person may want to hold their water
access right and allocation rather than use it. They may do so because
they want to sell it rather than use it themselves, or they may hold it
for environmental purposes. If someone has a right to use water but
does not do so then the water remains in the system and potentially
benefits the environment. If a person wishes to purchase a water access right and allocation and use it, they must also obtain a site use
approval or water delivery right (which would not be the case in a
bundled system). Arguably under the bundled system the person
would find it almost impossible to enter the water market on the
terms they desired because of the conditions of a site use approval,
which would be attached to the license.

Although not identified in the South Australian government’s policy on unbundling, there are also some potential disadvantages of the unbundling process if
taken to the full extent contemplated by the National Water Initiative and the licensing provisions in the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA). They include
•

194.

Within a prescribed water area, if there is more than one consump195
tive pool, no trade can occur between those pools.
AUSTL. COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 183, at 43.

195.
A water access entitlement under the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 is an entitlement for the license holder to gain access to a share of water in a defined consumptive pool or pools:
Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 146(2). The holder obtains a water allocation for that
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The extraction of water through the water resource works approval is
not linked to the allocation. The licensee needs to be very aware of
their water allocation and any limits imposed on the water resource
works approval that may be difficult for them to manage at any particular site where the licensee holds more than one water resource
works approval. In the case of bundling, the license makes clear the
amount of water allocated to the licensee and therefore what can be
extracted through the water resource works, all in the one docu196
ment.
The current bundled licensing system that operates in South Australia, with its attendant conditions and restrictions that effectively deal
with the allocation, approval of extraction and water conveyance
equipment, and the rules about where and how the water is to be
used is understood and accepted by water users requiring some form
197
of water management authorization. A new unbundled system
brings with it some uncertainty for water users.

The use of an unbundled system is therefore potentially costlier and administratively more burdensome than a bundled system of water rights. An individual annual fee may be charged for each water management authorization, whereas in a
bundled system there is only one annual license fee.
198
Given the history of governmental reform throughout the 1990s and 2000s,
199
and the added urgency brought on by the Millennium Drought, we argue that
the real driver of pressure for unbundling of water rights was the situation in the
Murray-Darling basin. If that is so, then the process has been successful to the extent that all water rights along the River Murray have been unbundled by the three
key states (Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia), permitting efficient
200
and effective interstate trade arrangements. Water trades have continued to rise

defined pool. A holder may only transfer their allocation within the consumptive pool to which they
have access. Id. at s 150(1).
196.

Id. at s 159.

197.
For example, see the concerns expressed by the South East Natural Resource Management
Board in its submissions on the proposal to create new natural resource management legislation. BECKY
HURST CONSULTING, supra note 180, at 57.
198.

COUNCIL OF AUSTL. GOV’TS, supra note 138.

199.
The Millennium Drought in Australia lasted from 2001-2009 and was arguably the longest
and most severe drought since Europeans settled the continent in 1788. It affected almost all of the
southern part of the Australian continent including the major cities of Melbourne and Adelaide. The
state of South Australia was particularly hard hit; authorities established various measures to guarantee
certainty of water supply to Adelaide, including the construction of a very expensive desalination plant.
MURRAY-DARLING BASIN ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, ROYAL COMMISSION (2019),
https://www.mdbrc.sa.gov.au/sites/default/files/murray-darling-basin-royal-commission-report.pdf?v=
1548898371.
200.

McKane and Franssen, supra note 172, at 62.
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across the country, many of them within the Murray-Darling basin, an area which
covers a seventh of the Australian continent’s land mass and has been described as
201
the “breadbasket of the nation.” Across the Australian continent, entitlement and
water allocation trade volumes in 2016–17 were 2,100 gigaliters, which was 23%
202
higher than in 2015–16. The total volume of surface water allocations traded during the same period was 7,000 gigaliters, which is 20% higher than the previous
203
year. While much of that trade occurred within the Murray-Darling Basin region, a substantial number of trades occurred outside of the Murray-Darling Basin
204
system in accordance with relevant State legislation. The fact that states like
South Australia have not fully unbundled water rights does not appear to be preventing water trades.
As noted above, apart from the River Murray area and two prescribed wells
areas in the state, no other unbundling of water resources has occurred in South
Australia. This is despite statutory provisions which contemplate that unbundled
water rights are the norm when any licenses involving the taking and use of water
are issued, and various government policy statements to the effect that unbundling
will occur and be implemented as part of the regular review of water allocation
205
plans.
Still, the separation of property rights in relation to land and water appears to
have been achieved and accepted. The fact that in South Australia most water
rights remain bundled does not appear to have prevented trade in water allocations
and entitlements, although it remains an open question whether there would be a
greater number of trades if the water licenses were split into the various constituent water management authorizations contemplated by the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA). With respect to their water entitlements, people remain
able to sell, lease, bequeath, and treat as equitable those rights without much ap-

201.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., A NATIONAL PLAN FOR WATER SECURITY 3 (25 January
2007), http://www.crcsi.com.au/assets/Resources/f21ceb9e-2258-4f40-9e11-50fa80ee940e.pdf.
202.
See ABARES Australian Water Markets Reports 2016-17, AUSTL. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & WATER,
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/water/aust-water-markets-reports (last visited
Mar. 15, 2018).
203.
See Water in Australia, AUSTL. BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY, http://www.bom.gov.au/
water/waterinaustralia/ (last visited June 24, 2019).
204.
Each Australian state has in place a similar system for licensing and managing water use and
allocation as part of the requirement to which all states and the Australian Capital Territory agreed as
part of the National Water Initiative in 2004. All states exhibit similar experiences to South Australia,
with entitlements to some resources being unbundled and others remaining bundled. See Australia’s Water Blueprint: National Reform Assessment 2014, AUSTL. NAT’L WATER COMM’N (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/water/nwi-assessment-2014.pdf.
205.
The Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) contemplates that Natural Resources Management Boards will review their plans on a regular basis and must review their entire regional Natural
Resources Management Plan (which includes the Water Allocation Plan) at least once every 10 years.
The water allocation plans reviewed to date seem to be reviewed after 10 years, not earlier. Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 81(4).
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parent trouble. 206 Thus, although South Australia has not fully implemented unbundling across the entire state, there is nevertheless recognized water management taking place. Trades of water are occurring, irrigators are obtaining access to
water allocations for irrigation purposes, and the National Water Initiative re207
quirements are being implemented to a reasonable extent.
South Australia’s dry conditions have made irrigators and industry very conscious of the regular shortages of water and the need to adopt as many water con208
servation measures as possible; long gone are the days of profligate and unsus209
tainable irrigation practices. Water is an expensive and precious commodity, and
the approach to its use by the South Australian irrigators in particular is by and
large sensible and pragmatic. This has, in turn, influenced their approach to the
trading of water entitlements. In light of the careful approach taken by South Australian irrigators, the policy and legislative approach to unbundling pursued by
South Australia may go too far—it may result in an inability to make effective and
efficient use of the water resource for irrigated agriculture. Or, as we have described it here, the approach taken in South Australia has the potential to create
anticommons tragedies in respect to the allocation and use of water.

CONCLUSION
The South Australian experience reveals that both government policy and the
market itself are driving the approach to unbundling. And as we have shown, neither those charged with implementing the law relating to unbundling, nor the market actors holding existing proprietary interests in water, are eager fully to implement unbundling, or even to implement it at all. The policy, which prompted the
pursuit of water regulation reform in Australia in the mid-1990s, was aimed at improving the competitiveness of the Australian agricultural product. According to
the liberal economic consensus of the time, a more efficient allocation of resources
could be achieved by the creation of a freer market for inputs, in this case water.
But the reluctance, which has hindered reform for the last two decades, suggests
that the policy has failed to convince all stakeholders.
It seems that the reforms have done nothing to resolve the identified tension
between ecological and social interests in preserving natural water sources and the
economic interest in achieving their most efficient allocation for production. If anything, unbundling would tilt the balance further toward the latter. Market actors,
especially those who hold rights to water that would be eroded by unbundling, are

206.

BECKY HURST CONSULTING, supra note 180, at 56-57.

207.

AUSTL. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, supra note 204, at 280-97.

208.
Water for Good, GOV’T OF S. AUSTL. DEP’T OF WATER, LAND AND BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION (2009) https://www.environment.sa.gov.au/files/sharedassets/public/water/water-forgood-full-plan.pdf.
209.

Id. at 16.

_JCI_BABIE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2019]

Property in Water: A Cautionary Tale From Australia

2/25/2020 4:03 PM

143

unwilling to cede the economic advantage that the existing system has given them.
The ecological interest will only become more urgent as the prospect of climate
change—and so the harshening of dry conditions—makes water a scarcer resource.
Ultimately, the balance is a question of social objectives. What is the most favored
use and allocation of the scarce supply of water in Australia? What then follows is
the legal mechanism to realize the objective. Without addressing the ecological/social–economic/productive tension, the legal mechanism will remain deficient.
Arguably, the process of unbundling in South Australia has never really taken
off because irrigators who most need the water and the trading rights in relation to
that water have been able to obtain and make use of water without too much trouble using existing bundled licenses. In short, irrigators want maximal certainty and
minimal delays, costs, and administrative burden. Our anecdotal assessment reveals, however, that in South Australia there is a perception among some that the
introduction of an unbundled system and the associated permits and approvals will
210
add to administrative load, increase costs, and result in a slower transfer process.
211
Unbundling of water rights contemplates rights that are transferable, typically
212
through separating those rights from underlying interests in land. It is understandable that irrigators might believe that separate permits for different uses of
water will be both expensive and administratively burdensome. At present, the
bundled licenses allow all administrative aspects of water use to be dealt with by
way of conditions attached to the transfer of a water license. Water allocation remains subject to conditions as to its use on-site and appropriate works for extraction, conveyance, and storage. The current bundled licenses allow for assurances in
relation to use and extraction to be dealt with pursuant to the Natural Resources
213
Management Act 2004 (SA), which requires that the transfer of a water license
214
and allocation are both subject to the Minister’s approval. As such, unless conditions on use and infrastructure are attached, the Minister will withhold consent to
the transfer.
In short, our assessment suggests that the objectives of the National Water Initiative are being achieved even in the absence of full implementation of unbundled
water rights, and that water users—market actors—seem to be happy with the system. We are left with a simple conclusion: why change a system that seems to be
working? There are, of course, more serious reasons for asking whether unbundling
will achieve the objectives claimed by its proponents. For while the failure to implement unbundling on the part of governmental actors, or to take it up on the part
of market actors cannot be taken as causally related to concerns about an anticommons tragedy, it ought at the very least to stand as a warning to those advocating
210.

BECKY HURST CONSULTING, supra note 180, at 56.

211.

Water access entitlement and water allocation. See supra Section II.A.

212.

Water resource works approval and site use approval. See supra Section II.A.

213.

Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s 150(4).

214.

Id. at s 157(2).
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the full unbundling of proprietary interests in water. As Heller cautions,215 any
moves which take a system of property closer to the anticommons end of the spectrum risk even greater inefficiency in the use of the subject resource.
Our theoretical assessment of anticommons property and its potential for
tragedies, when applied to the anecdotal evidence of attitudes in South Australia to
unbundled water rights reveals an opposition to further unbundling. Further empirical research is needed, both of the market and of market actors, which will test
the validity of the claims made by advocates of unbundling, the perceived need on
the part of water users for such measures, and the potential for anticommons tragedies following from full implementation. The need for such empirical evidence is
not limited to South Australia. As we suggested in the Introduction, many other
jurisdictions are currently either considering or in the process of implementing
some form of unbundling of water resource allocations. As the movement towards
unbundling gathers pace, we are in need of empirical evidence in order to assess, as
a matter of law, the effectiveness of such systems.

215.

Heller, supra note 60, at 623-24, 677.

